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Ageing componentsa b s t r a c t
A nuclear reactor is expected to function for extensive periods, during which, coolant circulation and core
reactivity must always be maintained safely. Understanding the risks associated with the operation of
such systems requires proper consideration of ageing components and the effects of preventative main-
tenance. The traditional methodologies, such as Fault Trees and Event Trees, have limitations in their abil-
ities to model ageing processes and complex maintenance strategies. Petri Nets have been used in this
research as a more suitable alternative. A case study reactor is presented to demonstrate this capability.
Petri Nets were developed for five key subsystems: primary coolant circulation, shutdown condensation,
emergency core coolant injection, emergency shutdown, and control and monitoring, building a repre-
sentation which considers their failure modes, reaction of the system to faults, and ongoing component
maintenance actions. These models reveal statistics for the timing of failure of these subsystems and rel-
ative frequencies of outcome categories.
 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The pressing climatological crisis demands the reorientation of
electricity generation away from fossil fuels towards alternatives,
including nuclear energy. The low rate of construction of new
nuclear power installations from the mid-1980s onwards (IAEA,
2019) has resulted in a high average operating lifespan for existing
reactors, often beyond their original design life. Rather than take
on the political and economic costs associated with new build
nuclear projects, the decision has often been made to extend the
mission of existing power stations instead. Therefore, when con-
sidering the risks associated with a design, the assessment
methodology must be able to capture the progressive increase in
component failure rates as the reactor ages and also the complex
asset management strategies used to control this process.
Risk assessment of modern industrial plant are commonly per-
formed using a combination of fault tree and event tree methods
(Rasmussen, 1975). H.A. Watson conceived the Fault Tree method-
ology at Bell laboratories in the 1960s (Watson et al., 1961). As
seen in Fig. 1, a Fault Tree model is a graphical representation of
how component failures, represented by basic events, can combineto cause the occurrence of a single specific undesired outcome,
known the top event. Logic gates such as AND and OR are used
to express how the fault propagation to system level occurs. Qual-
itative analysis of the fault tree structure yields the minimum cut
sets, these being the smallest combinations of basic events
required to cause the top event.
By the end of the decade, W.E. Vesely (Vesely, 1970) had pro-
gressed the quantification methodology with the development of
a time-dependant analysis known as a Kinetic Fault Tree. This
enables the computation of the top event probability or frequency
from the probability and frequency of the component failures. Fur-
thermore, importance measures (Ruijters and Stoelinga, 2015)
reflecting the relative significance of the contributions from each
component or cut sets may be found, allowing attention in the
design process to directed to the occurrence of safety critical
failures.
In 1993, A. Rauzy (Rauzy, 1993) provided an alternative means
to quantify the fault tree using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs).
By comparison to the Kinetic Fault Tree methodology, this method
provides both an accurate and efficient methodology, eliminating
the need for approximations in the traditional analysis method
(Reay and Andrews, 2002).
Event Trees originate with the WASH-1400 report led by N.C.
Rasmussen at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975
Fig. 1. A simple Fault Tree comprised of a system reliant on two components.
Component 1 has two redundant subcomponents, both of which must fail to disable
it. Component 2 can be disabled by either one of two basic events. The minimum
cuts sets are {A,B,C}, {D}, and {E}.
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can occur following the occurrence of an initial event, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. They consider all possible responses of safety systems fol-
lowing the initiating event. In 2000, a methodology was developed
by J.D. Andrews and S.J. Dunnett (Andrews and Dunnett, 2000) for
Event Trees making use of Binary Decision Diagrams.
In the integrated Fault Tree and Event Tree analysis there is an
assumption that the basic events occur independently. Also, in the
majority of commercial codes implementing the analysis, there is
an assumption that components fail with a constant failure rate.Fig. 2. A Event Tree with three possible branching points following the initiating event, in
attempt the third. Each condition can succeed or fail with probabilities P1S ; P2S , and P3S
frequency of m.
2
Hence their wear-out cannot be represented. Component repair
times are also commonly limited to unrealistic exponential distri-
butions and complex repair processes cannot be represented,
meaning that the traditional assessment processes are limited in
their ability to model ageing reactors. At present, there is no imple-
mentation of Fault Trees or Event trees that allows the representa-
tion of both non-constant failure rates and complex systems of
repair and maintenance. Critically, neglecting to consider increas-
ing failure rates, such as is found in an ageing component, can
result in an underestimation of time-to-failure and thus also the
overall system risk.
An alternative system failure modelling approach, which has
the ability to overcome these deficiencies is the Petri Net method
(Carl, 1962). Applications of this methodology have already
occurred in the civil nuclear energy industry (Lee and Seong,
2004; Németh et al., 2009; Aldemir, 2013; Kachur and Shakhova,
2016; Ponciroli et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2016; Singh and Rajput,
2016; Kumar et al., 2019; Wootton et al., 2019). It has the potential
to overcome the deficiencies in the Fault Tree and Event Tree
methodologies when representing ageing systems and capturing
restorative processes and asset management strategies. The
trade-off for the advantages that Petri Nets offer is the requirement
to perform simulations to evaluate the model where many itera-
tions may be required to reach convergence, increasing computa-
tional expenditure. However, the extensive capabilities of Petri
Nets justify this choice when a high fidelity representation of the
dynamics of a system is desired. With a Petri Net, is it possible to
model changes in system operating mode, e.g. from general opera-
tion to shutdown or emergency coolant injection. Likewise, a com-
ponent in the model may have arbitrarily many states in which it
can exist beyond simply functional or failed; for instance a
stand-by state, any number of degrees of degradation, or several
mutually exclusive or concurrent failure modes. Multiple compo-
nents working together can be modelled, with the ability to cap-
ture their functional dependency, rather than being required to
assume independence. Any number of different probability distri-
butions can be used within a single model for the timing of its
events, thereby facilitating the inclusion of diverse failure mecha-
nisms and maintenance regimes. Furthermore, aside from allowing
the representation of complex stochastic processes, Petri Net struc-
tures can also include features highly useful to reliability mod-
elling, such as the development of concurrent and synchronous
processes (Aubry et al., 2016).which the failure of both the first and second condition disables the opportunity to
, and P1F ; P2F , and P3F , where PnS ¼ 1 PnF , with the initiating event occurring at a
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the objective of the research presented in this paper. Its demon-
stration is achieved through the examination of a case study sys-
tem described in Section 2. Existing Petri Net research regarding
civil nuclear energy broadly falls into two categories. Some use
Petri Nets as a language for the development and representation
of specific operational processes or procedures (Lee and Seong,
2004; Németh et al., 2009; Kachur and Shakhova, 2016; Ponciroli
et al., 2016), in other cases to drive a coupled physical simulation
(Ponciroli et al., 2016; Wootton et al., 2019). With the exception
of Wootton et al. 2019 (Wootton et al., 2019), these works did
not perform risk or reliability assessment in their nuclear system.
In other works, Petri Nets were used as a description of part of a
nuclear system, but were evaluated by other means, with the
model converted to another form, such as Markov chains (Singh
et al., 2016), reachability graphs (Singh and Rajput, 2016), or both
(Kumar et al., 2019), rather than by direct simulation. Conse-
quently, some of the advantages of Petri Nets were eroded, such
as the ability to represent time, or the quantification of uncer-
tainty, with the latter demonstrated in this work. In many cases,
the Petri Nets presented are relatively small, but greater complex-
ity is achievable. The Petri Nets in this paper are simulated directly
and illustrate how the methodology can facilitate probabilistic
safety assessment of nuclear plants with estimation of statistical
confidence.2. Reactor case study
A generic nuclear reactor with modern design features, illus-
trated in Fig. 3, is used to demonstrate the methodology developed.
The core itself is cooled by vertical coolant channels surrounding
fuel rods, with a liquid heavy water moderator. Light water coolant
enters the core via an inlet header and leaves through an outlet
header. Circulation through the four steam separators on this loop
is driven by thermosiphon action. From the steam separators,
steam is extracted to drive turbines. Following re-condensation,











Fig. 3. Schematic overview of the case
3
Under normal operating circumstances, reactor shutdown is
scheduled after three years of operation in order to perform rou-
tine maintenance. In the event that a steam drum or one of the sec-
tions of pipe connecting it to the core (collectively referred to as a
steam circuit) suffers rupture, the reactor may remain online, but
maintenance is scheduled for six months following the break.
However, should the functionality of a second steam circuit be lost,
immediate shutdown is enacted. The loss of a third steam circuit
constitutes a major fault, and to requires the use of the emergency
core coolant injection system. Faults in either the inlet header, out-
let header or the internal coolant channels of the core also activate
the injection of emergency coolant.
Of the three feed pumps, two must be running at any one time,
with the third on standby if either of the others fail. Additionally,
the pumps in use are cycled to allowmaintenance to be performed,
running for six months at a time, staggered so as to come off-line
separately. If a pump experiences an electrical or mechanical fault
and no redundant pump is available, or the redundant pump fails
to come online on demand, reactor shutdown becomes necessary
to allow repairs to be made. Breakages in the pipes running from
the steam separators to the turbine and faults in the turbine or
condenser themselves also require the reactor to shutdown to rec-
tify the problem.
Control rods are used to maintain a steady critical state in the
reactor, and must be positioned appropriately to this end. Failure
of the electric drive or the electric signal to the control rods results
in inappropriate rod positioning. Hardware or software faults with
the controlling automation system can also bring about this situa-
tion. If, because of such a misplacement, or for some other reason, a
transient reactivity event occurs, a set of sensors is present to
detect it. This consists of three neutron detectors (NDs) and three
ion chambers (ICs). Both function with a two-of-three voting sys-
tem, requiring that at least two sensors of the same set make a
simultaneous reading to deliver a measurement from their block.
This acts as a counter measure against the possibility that sensors
can provide both false positive (detection of a non-existent
increase or decrease in reactivity) and false negative (failure to
detect a real increase or decrease in reactivity) readings. Failure












study reactor used in this work.
Fig. 4. Key to standard Petri Net objects. From left to right: empty place, place with
one token, timed transition, instant transition, standard arc, standard arc with
weight of two.
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of power output respectively.
To shutdown the reactor, the control rods are positioned to cre-
ate a subcritical state and the turbine isolation valve closes to dis-
connect the turbine, with coolant instead running from the steam
separators to eight shutdown condensers providing decay heat
extraction using a large water tank as a heat sink. If the valve fails
to shut, or subsequently opens once closed, a redundant valve is
available. The event of either closing prematurely, forces the reac-
tor to enter the shutdown process. Leakage from the tank requires
that the reactor go directly to emergency shutdown. The isolation
condensers themselves are arranged in pairs, with two parallel air
operated valves (AOVs) separating each pair from the coolant cir-
culation system during normal operation. The opening of one
AOV is enough to engage the pair, the second valve providing
redundancy. When the isolation valve closes to initiate shutdown,
pressure builds in the isolation condensers until it is sufficient to
open the AOVs. To complete the shutdown process, at least half
of the isolation condensers must come into use and remain opera-
tional for its forty day duration. As well the potential to lose two
isolation condensers if both valves of an AOV pair fail to open, indi-
vidual condensers can be disabled by rupture or calcification once
in active use.
In the event of a loss of core pressure, four pressure accumula-
tors stand ready to perform high pressure coolant inject through an
emergency inlet header for a period of half hour. This is immedi-
ately followed by low pressure injection lasting three days and at
the end of this process the core is completely submerged in water.
Low pressure injection is driven by gravity and sources its water
from the same overhead tank as that used as a heat sink by the
shutdown condensers. There are four pressure accumulators in
total, and the equivalent of half their collective capacity is required
for the high pressure injection period. When demand is placed on a
pressure accumulator, an AOV must open, followed by a rupture
disk. If either of these fail, the coolant will not be released. In the
event that a rupture disk experiences a partial failure and does
not open fully, it is assumed that half of its pressure accumulator
contribution is available. Once the pressure accumulators are on-
line, the connection between them and the core must remain intact
without rupture until the beginning of low pressure injection.
Additionally, the rupture disks can break prematurely, and in doing
so, render their pressure accumulator unavailable on demand. As
with the steam separators, if one such fault occurs, shutdown for
maintenance is scheduled for six months after its emergence. In
the event that two failures occur, the reactor shutdown is
immediate.
The system has two independent processes for rapid emergency
reactor shutdown, respectively Shutdown System One and Shut-
down System Two (SDS-1 and SDS-2). In SDS-1, forty shutdown
rods, suspended above the core, de-latch automatically and fall
into the core. This is activated on a trip signal, generated in the
event that either the coolant pressure drops too low, or the tem-
perature reaches the Currie point of a magnet in the mechanism.
Once released, each rod falls into its slot under gravity. If thirty-
eight of the rods correctly insert, SDS-1 is considered successful.
Otherwise, SDS-2 activates and uses pressurised helium to rapidly
inject the neutron poison, boric acid, into the moderator. Providing
the helium release mechanism operates correctly, the boric acid
must pass through one of three valves to reach the core – a pres-
sure activated valve, a reactor trip signal operated valve, and a
manually operated valve. As these are in parallel, the successful
opening of any one valve is sufficient. If any of these valves opens
prematurely, the unintended presence of boric acid in the moder-
ator will result in an unplanned shutdown. Leakage from the sup-
ply of either helium or boric acid will require the reactor to4
immediately go to shutdown to allow for restorative actions to
be taken.
3. Timed Petri Net methodology
3.1. Overview
Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (Carl, 1962; Balbo, 2007) with
atomic firing are used to model the system dynamics in this
research. They consist of four basic objects; the place, the transition,
the arc, and the token, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Places, drawn as cir-
cles, represent information about the current state of the system,
such as the condition or availability of components and resources.
The status of the system at any point in the lifetime simulation is
represented by locating tokens in the places. The number of tokens,
drawn as black dots, in a place is referred to as its marking. A tran-
sition, drawn as a square, updates the markings of places con-
nected to it by arcs in order to represent events which change
the state of the system, such as failures and repairs, as well as per-
forming simple logical operations. In this way the dynamics of the
system operation are propagated through the Petri Net. The arcs
are either input arcs or output arcs, which determines whether
tokens are taken or given to a place when the transition fires. The
orientation of the arrows on the arcs denotes the direction of token
motion. The number of tokens travelling along each arc is indicated
by an associated weight (known as its multiplicity) for the arc.
Before a transition fires, it first needs to be enabled. For a transition
to be enabled each input place must contain at least its arc multi-
plicity of tokens. The transition then fires after a delay time associ-
ated with the transition. This delay time can be specified or
sampled from a probability distribution. On firing, the multiplicity
of tokens is extracted from each of the input places for the transi-
tion and the multiplicity of tokens is added to each of the output
places. Should an arc not have an associated multiplicity then the
default multiplicity of 1 is assumed. The requisite token placement
required to enable a transition must persist uninterrupted until it
fires, otherwise it will return to an unenabled state and its previous
time to fire discarded. If multiple transitions are scheduled to fire
at the same moment, one is chosen at random with uniform prob-
ability. The scheduled firing time of all other transitions is pre-
served when one transition fires if the requisite places markings
continue to be satisfied.
Inhibit arcs can also be featured on a Petri net. These are repre-
sented by a red arc with a dotted line from a place to a transition.
The arrowhead on the arc is replaced by a circle. In the event that
the place contains at least its arc multiplicity of tokens then the
transition it is connected to is prevented from firing. An example
of the transition firing process is seen in Fig. 5.
As depicted in Fig. 6, other features used include the place con-
dition arc and the voting transition. The place conditional arc is
drawn with a blue dashed line with a circular end. A place condi-
tional arc applies a modifier to the delay between a transition
becoming enabled and its firing based on its weight and the num-
ber of tokens held at the connected place. The voting transition has
a threshold associated with it, which specifies the number of
Fig. 5. Illustration of Petri Net transition firing.
Fig. 6. Examples illustrating the extended Petri Net objects used in this work.
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standard transition which requires all to be satisfied. When the
voting transition fires, all places of incoming arcs whose weight
is met lose tokens, with the rest left unaltered. A voting transition
is drawn as a three-dimensional box, with its incoming arcs drawn
with alternating length dashed line and its threshold written below
its identifying label. It interacts with place conditional and inhibit
arcs in identical fashion as normal transitions.
In this work, the software used for Petri Net modelling is called
Macchiato and was developed in-house at the University of
Nottingham.
3.2. Analysis of the Petri Net
The analysis of the Petri net is carried out using Monte Carlo
simulation (Metropolis and Ulam, 1949). This method performs5
experiments on the computer which replicates potential life histo-
ries of the plant taking random samples from the probability distri-
butions representing transition firing delay times. When enough
simulations have been performed to give convergence, a statistical
analysis can be carried out to provide performance metrics for the
time durations and number of occurrences of any places on the
network. The network places are selected to give the performance
variables required by the study.
3.3. Firing delay calculation
A fixed delay transition fires after a set duration, a, and a tran-
sition with a uniform distribution gives even weighting to values
within a range, parametrised by u, giving the probability density
function, f ðt;uÞ, for time to fire, t, such that:
f ðt;uÞ ¼
1




Fig. 7. Petri Net model depicting the primary coolant system. Steam separators are highlighted in green, feed pumps in blue, isolation valves in read, and miscellaneous pipes
in yellow.
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Fig. 8. Petri Net model for the shutdown condenser subsystem used for decay heat removal. Note the repeated sections indicated within the dashed and dotted boxes.
Fig. 9. Petri Net model for emergency core coolant injection process. The high
pressure injection section is highlighted yellow and the low pressure section in
green. Note the repeated sections indicated within the black dashed box.
"
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next whole multiple of its parameter, c. A second parameter, x,
allows one to offset these firings. For example, for two transitions
required to fire once an hour, thirty minutes apart, these would be
parameterised with c = 1, x = 0, and c = 1, x = 0.5.
The Weibull Distribution (Papoulis and Unnikrishna Pillai,
2002; Jiang and Murthy, 2011) is used widely in reliability engi-
neering for modelling component failures. Its two-parameter form
is characterised by the scale parameter, g, which indicates the time
at which approximately two-thirds of the population of compo-
nents will fail, and a shape parameter, b, which indicates if infant
mortality, random failures or wear-out is taking place. For b < 1,
failure rate decreases with time. With b > 1, the failure rate grows
with time, representative of an ageing process. If b = 1, the failure
rate is constant. Eq. (2) gives the probability density function,
f ðt;g; bÞ, of the Weibull Distribution:









The Log-Normal Distribution, widely used to model repair
times, is given by the result of the exponential function applied
to the result of a normal distribution (Weisstein, 2019), such that
the resulting variable is normally distributed in magnitude
(Dennis and Patil, 1987). As seen in Eq. (3), for a normal distribu-
tion with mean and standard deviation given by l and r, the prob-
ability density function, f ðt;l;rÞ, is:
f ðt;l;rÞ ¼






When a transition is connected to one or more place conditional





where Wi is the weight of the ith place conditional arc and Ni is the
number of tokens on the corresponding place. A parameter7
(a;u; c;g, or l, as relevant) from the transition’s probability distri-
bution is then modified by dividing it by P, with these parameters
being chosen to scale the time to fire of a transition in inverse pro-
portion with P. This system was chosen to allow the description of
arbitrary mechanisms of time to fire alteration with respect to one
or many place markings. Uniquely among arc types, the place con-
ditional arc is not limited to an integer weight.4. Subsystem models
The five subsystems isolated for study are the circulation of pri-
mary coolant, the shutdown condensers, the emergency injection
of core coolant, the emergency shutdown mechanisms, and the
reactor control and reactivity monitoring equipment. For each, a
Petri Net model has been created and these are presented in sec-
tion 4.1 to 4.5, with illustrations in Figs. 7–11 and corresponding
parameters in Tables 1–5. Every object is assigned a unique code
to identify it and are referred to by such in the text, with places
having a code commencing with ‘‘P” and those of transitions with
‘‘T”, with the exception of terminal places, which are labelled with
the outcome that they represent. Throughout this work, wherever
relevant, parameters are expressed in terms of hours.
The structure of these Petri Nets follows from the description of
the system outlined in Section 2, being developed in consultation
with the knowledge and experience of reactor system engineers
at IGCAR and BARC. An individual Petri Net structure does not
require a long time to develop, but the process to compile and
combine the necessary data (e.g. failure rates) can be time consum-
ing, and the model may go through multiple iterations as part of
the discussion with experts. As such, any one Petri Net and its
parameters might typically be the product of several days worth
of work.
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Fig. 10. Petri Net model for the emergency reactor shutdown processes. The shutdown rods are highlighted in yellow and the neutron poison injection in green. Note the
repeated sections indicated within the dashed box.
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9
Fig. 11. (a) Control rod hardware (yellow), automation system (red), and ion chambers (IC) and neutron detectors (ND) in the reactor controls system Petri Net. Note the
repeated sections indicated within the dashed and dotted boxes. The green section describes the operation of the ion chambers and neutron detectors, and the blue section
processes the resulting reactivity events. This figure continues overleaf. Sensor outcomes and signal processing for the reading from the ion chambers (IC) and neutron
detectors (ND) in the Petri Net model for the reactor controls systems, continued from previous page. Note the repeated sections indicated within the dashed box.
Mark James Wootton, J.D. Andrews, A.L. Lloyd et al. Annals of Nuclear Energy 166 (2022) 1087014.1. Primary coolant circulation
The Petri Net model concerning initiating events in the primary
coolant circulation system is found Fig. 7 and the parameters asso-
ciated with its transitions are found in Table 1. There are two pos-
sible outcomes of each simulated iteration – the emergence of a
failure event that requires urgent intervention from the emergency
coolant injection system (hereafter referred to as an initiating
event), or the safe shutdown of the reactor through the shutdown
condensers, such that repairs may be performed, respectively
labelled ‘‘Coolant Fault” and ‘‘SDC Wait Over”. If no faults have
occurred within a three year period, the reactor is shutdown for
routine maintenance, which is represented by the transition, TSM.
The green section of the Petri Net covers the four circuits
between the reactor headers and the steam separators, including
four failure modes, rupture of the down comer pipe to the core,
the returning pipe, and the steam separator itself, as well as its
pressure release valve, respectively TDC(1–4), TRP(1–4), TSS(1–
4), and TSSPR(1–4). Any of these failures disables the circuit, put-
ting a token on PCC(1/3/5/7), which causes TCP(1–4) to record
the failure as an additional token at PCC9. The initial token at
PCC(2/4/6/8) ensures that the loss of a circuit can only be recorded10once. TSMSS1 fires after a delay of six months to initiate shutdown
for repairs, requiring only one token at PCC9. Two tokens are
needed to fire the instant transition, TMSS2, which calls for imme-
diate shutdown in the event of two circuits losses. The number of
tokens on PCC9 is conserved when either of these transitions fires.
Therefore, the place continues to track the number of failed circuits
during shutdown, such that TCCF fires if a third fails in this period
to indicate a major coolant fault.
The feed pumps are modelled in the blue section. The simula-
tion begins with pumps 1 and 2 online and 3 on standby, as indi-
cated by the initial token placements for PFPa(1–3). For a
running pump, transitions TFPMF(1/3/5) and TFPEF(1/3/5) respec-
tively represent mechanical and electrical failures, with TFPMF
(2/4/6) and TFPEF(2/4/6) likewise representing the repair pro-
cesses. When repairs are complete, TFPMR(1–3) and TFPER(1–3)
mark PFPS(1–3) to indicate that the pump is ready for use again.
Transitions TFPRa(1–3) are the repair processes, taking a pump off-
line to services it before TFPRb(1–3) returns it to availability. The
transitions TFPSR(1–3) and places PFPSRC and PFPSN track
whether a pump is available to be brought into active use, and as
two pumps are always required to be online, the inhibit arcs from
PFPSRN to TFPSR(1–3) prevent a pump from being serviced when
Fig. 11 (continued)
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chance that when being brought into online, a pump will fail to
start, and one cannot attempt to use it again until repaired, with
this possibility described by TFPAF(1–3), PFPFTS(1–3), and TPFAR
(1–3), where TFPA(1–3) is the normal behaviour of activation of
a pump. TFPon(1–3), TFPoff(1–3), PFPoff(1–3), PFPoff(1–3), record
which pumps are online, recording the total number of offline
pumps on PFPTF. If this reaches two with no replacement pumps
available (note the inhibit arc from PFPSRC), TFPF1 fires, setting
motion a demand for reactor isolation and shutdown.
The red section pertains to the isolation valves. The arrival of a
token at PTI1 indicates demand for reactor shutdown. If PVTIa1
still has its initial token, an attempt to close the first isolation valve
is made, with TTIS1 representing the possibility that it fails to do
so. This becomes progressively more likely with each passing year
of operation, which is represented by the place conditional arc
from PV2, with TVA1 incrementing its tokens once a year. A suc-
cessful closure of the first isolation valve, TTIVb1, puts a token
on PTSDC1, beginning the shutdown condenser process. If the
valve fails to shut or opens due to failure once closed, see TTIFOT1,
the second valve must be used, and a token is placed on PTI2 to
indicate this demand. The Petri Net structure for the second valve11is identical to the first, except that the outcome of failed closure of
this valve is an emergency coolant fault. There also exists a possi-
bility that either of the valves will close prematurely, instigating an
unplanned shutdown, with TTIVa(1–2) representing this failure
mode.
4.2. Shutdown condensers
The Petri Net modelling the shutdown condensers is shown in
Fig. 8, with its parameterisation located in Table 2. Its possible out-
comes are the safe completion of the shutdown condensation
decay heat removal process, its failure, and the requirement for
emergency shutdown if a leak develops from the water pooled
used as a heat sink.
Demand on the shutdown condensers is created by the closure
of the isolation valve, and this Petri Net uses this event as its main
starting point, with TSCC1a and TSCC1b respectively representing
demand placed due the need for early shutdown (the paramterisa-
tion of which is derived from the results of the primary coolant
Petri Net described in Section 4.1) and demand placed due the
end of the three year operation period. TSCB1 puts a token on
PDHR1 to set up a forty day timer i.e. TSCW1 and on each of
Table 1
Timed transition parameters for the primary coolant circulation Petri Net seen in Fig. 7.
Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref. Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref.





TDC(1–4) Weibull g ¼ 4:38 108,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TFPA(1–3) delay a ¼ 0:0003 (IAEA, 1988) TRP(1–4) Weibull g ¼ 1:75 106,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TFPAF(1–3) uniform u ¼ 0:63 (IAEA, 1988) TRCC Weibull g ¼ 1:62 106,
b ¼ 1:5
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TFPAR(1–3) delay a ¼ 20:9 (IAEA, 1988) TSM delay a ¼ 26298:0 N/A
TFPEFa(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 10600, b ¼ 1:2 (Smith, 1981; Barringer
&
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TSS(1–4) Weibull g ¼ 9:32 107,
b ¼ 1:2
(Expert Opinion; Barringer & Associates,
Inc., 2010)
TFPEFb(1–3) delay a ¼ 24:0 (IAEA, 1988) TSSPR(1–4) Weibull g ¼ 100000,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Barringer & Associates, Inc.,
2010)
TFPF1 delay a ¼ 0:0006 N/A TT1 Weibull g ¼ 1:13 106,
b ¼ 1:7
(Expert Opinion; Barringer & Associates,
Inc., 2010)
TFPMFa(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 14000, b ¼ 1:2 (IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TTIFOF(1–2) Weibull g ¼ 1:75 105,
b ¼ 1:0
(Expert Opinion; Morris, 2019)
TFPMFb(1–3) delay a ¼ 24:0 (IAEA, 1988) TTIS(1–2) uniform u ¼ 0:13 (IAEA, 1988)
TFPRa1 cyclic c ¼ 4383:0,
x ¼ 1461:0
N/A TTIVa(1–2) Weibull g ¼ 1:51 109,
b ¼ 1:1
(Expert Opinion; Barringer & Associates,
Inc., 2010)
TFPRa2 cyclic c ¼ 4383:0,
x ¼ 2922:0
N/A TTIVb(1–2) delay a ¼ 0:0003 (IAEA, 1988)
TFPRa3 cyclic c ¼ 4383:0, x ¼ 0:0 N/A TTP1 Weibull g ¼ 1:75 108,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TFPRb(1–3) delay a ¼ 20:9 (IAEA, 1988) TTP2 Weibull g ¼ 1:66 108,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TSDCW(1–2) delay a ¼ 960:0 N/A TTP3 Weibull g ¼ 1:00 108,
b ¼ 1:0
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta database,
2020)
TIH1 Weibull g ¼ 6:75 107,
b ¼ 1:2
(IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TVA1 delay a ¼ 8766:0 N/A
TMSS1 delay a ¼ 4383:0 N/A TVTRa(1–2) delay a ¼ 43830:0 N/A
Table 2
Timed transition parameters for shutdown condenser subsystem Petri Net seen in Fig. 8.
Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref. Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref.
TSCAOVF(1–4)(a/b) uniform u ¼ 0:278 (IAEA, 1988) TSCPL1 Weibull g ¼ 1:53 106, b ¼ 3:0 (Eide et al., 1990; Reliability
Eta Beta database, 2020)
TSCAOVO(1–4)(a/b) delay a ¼ 0:000278 (IAEA, 1988) TSCPL2 delay a ¼ 0:0 N/A
TSCC1a Weibull g ¼ 19000, b ¼ 1:0, Section 4.1 TSCSDPR(1–8) Weibull g ¼ 1:77 106, b ¼ 1:0 (IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
rx ¼ 30:0 TSCW1 delay a ¼ 960:0 N/A
TSCC1b delay a ¼ 26298:0 N/A TVA1 delay a ¼ 8766:0 N/A
TSCCAL(1–8) Weibull g ¼ 1:02 107, b ¼ 1:2 (IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
– – – –
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sent the opening of the AOVs when the requisite pressure is
reached, while TSCAOVF1a and TSCAOVF1b represent their failure
to open. If both fail, two tokens are placed on PSCFT1 to indicate
the loss of a pair of shutdown condensers. TSCSDPR1 and TSCCAL1
respectively represent pipe rupture and condenser calcification
during operation, each adding a token on PSCFT1. If the number
of tokens at PSCFT1 reaches five, more than half of the isolation
condensers are non-operational and TSCF1 fires to record the fail-
ure of the shutdown condensation process. The shutdown con-
densers rely on there being water in the pool to dump heat into.
If a leak emergences, see TSCPL1, before demand on the condensers
is placed, the reactor is at risk of being unable to enter the normal
shutdown process, and therefore emergency shutdown is required
to allow for the undertaking of repairs, represented by TSCPL2. If
shutdown condensation has already begun, the loss of this water
results in failure. As such, in the Petri Net, TSCPF1 can only fire if
the initial token at PSC0 is removed due to the inhibit arc. Being12an instant transition, TSCPF1 is given priority over TSCPL2 when
both are available to fire.
4.3. Emergency core coolant injection
Fig. 9 depicts the Petri Net representing the process by which
coolant is injected into the core to mitigate a loss of pressure.
The four available outcomes are its completion having submerged
the core, the failure of the pressure accumulators during high pres-
sure injection, the failure of the low pressure gravity driven injec-
tion from the over head pool, and the development of a situation
where the reactor must be shutdown to perform maintenance on
emergency injection components.
For the purposes of this Petri Net, a demand is generated uni-
formly between the beginning of the simulation and 3 years
40 days by the transition TPAD1, which puts a token on each of
PEECC(1–4). The yellow section represents the high pressure phase
and in the green one finds the low pressure coolant injection. The
Table 3
Timed transition parameters for emergency coolant injection Petri Net seen in Fig. 9.
Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref. Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref.
TGDWPFO1 delay a ¼ 72:0 N/A TPARDO(1–4) delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion; Eide et al., 1990)
TGDWPPO1 delay a ¼ 144:0 N/A TPARDOF(1–4) delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion; Eide et al., 1990)
TSCPL1 Weibull g ¼ 1:53 106,
b ¼ 3:0




TPARDOP(1–4) uniform u ¼ 0:235 (Expert Opinion; Eide et al., 1990)
TSCPL2 delay a ¼ 1:0 N/A TPASA1 delay a ¼ 0:5 N/A
TPAAOVF(1–4) uniform u ¼ 1:54321 (IAEA, 1988) TPASC(1–4) Weibull g ¼ 87700, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion; Reliability
Eta Beta database, 2020)
TPAAOVO(1–4) delay a ¼ 0:000278 (IAEA, 1988) TPINRF1 uniform u ¼ 1:51 (IAEA, 1988)
TPAD1 uniform u ¼ 27258:0 N/A TPINRO1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (IAEA, 1988)
TPAMF(1–4) uniform u ¼ 10300 (IAEA, 1988) TPIRDF1 uniform u ¼ 3:09 (Expert Opinion)
TPAMSD1 delay a ¼ 4383:0 N/A TPIRDO1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion)
TPAO(1–4) delay a ¼ 0:000278 (IAEA, 1988) TPIRDOF1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion)
TPAPR(1–4) a Weibull g ¼ 1:67 107, b ¼ 1:0 (IAEA, 1988) TPIRDOP1 uniform u ¼ 0:235 (Expert Opinion)
TPARDF(1–4) uniform u ¼ 3:09 (Expert Opinion;
Eide et al., 1990)
TVA1 delay a ¼ 8766:0 N/A
Table 4
Timed transition parameters for emergency shutdown subsystem Petri Net seen in Fig. 10.
Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref. Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref.
TBMRVF1 uniform u ¼ 4:41 (Miller et al., 1976) THESD1 delay a ¼ 2:0 N/A
TBMRVO1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Miller et al., 1976) THESF1 Weibull g ¼ 1:12 106,
b ¼ 3:0
(Expert Opinion; Reliability Eta Beta
database, 2020)
TBMRVSO1 Weibull g ¼ 8:64 105,
b ¼ 1:1
(IAEA, 1988; Reliability Eta Beta
database, 2020)
THESUA1 delay a ¼ 0:25 N/A
TBPVF1 uniform u ¼ 4:41 (Miller et al., 1976) TRACTF
(1–40)
Weibull g ¼ 1060,
b ¼ 1:2
(Smith, 1981; Reliability Eta Beta
database, 2020)
TBPVO1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Miller et al., 1976) TRACTR
(1–40)
delay a ¼ 24:0 N/A
TBPVSO1 Weibull g ¼ 8:64 105,
b ¼ 1:1




uniform u ¼ 2:78 (IAEA, 1988)
TBRTVF1 uniform u ¼ 4:41 (Miller et al., 1976) TRDLS(1–
40)
delay a ¼ 0:000278 (IAEA, 1988)
TBRTVS1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Miller et al., 1976) TRIF(1–
40)
uniform u ¼ 9:26 (Eide and Calley, 1993)
TBRTVSO1 Weibull g ¼ 8:64 105,
b ¼ 1:1




delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Eide and Calley, 1993)
TBTL1 Weibull g ¼ 4:16 107,
b ¼ 3:0




uniform u ¼ 1:07 (Expert Opinion)
TBTSUA1 delay a ¼ 0:25 N/A TRPSS(1–
40)
delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion)
THERMF1 uniform u ¼ 0:278 (Expert Opinion) TSDS1 uniform u ¼ 27258:0 N/A
THERMS1 delay a ¼ 0:000278 (Expert Opinion) TVA1 delay a ¼ 8766:0 N/A
THERMSO1 Weibull g ¼ 1:73 105,
b ¼ 1:1
(Smith, 1981; Reliability Eta Beta
database, 2020)
– – – –
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TPAO(1–4) and TPAMF(1–4) respectively, and while waiting for
demand for the system to be placed, the rupture disk separating
the pressure accumulator from the core may prematurely burst,
see TPASC(1–4), rendering it unavailable on demand. Hence, an
inhibit arc from PPASFO(1–4) suppresses TPAO(1–4), and TPAUA
(1–4) removes the token from PREECC(1–4). The number of pres-
sure accumulators failed before demand is recorded at PPAMR1,
with maintenance scheduled six months following one failure, or
immediately if a second fails. TPAAOVF(1–4) and TPAAOVO(1–4)
represent the failure to open or successful opening of the AOV,
with TPARDF1 and TPARDO1 respectively performing the same
roles for the rupture disk. Either one token or two is given to
PPARDO(2/4/6/8), depending on whether TPARDOP1 or TPARDOP2
fires. Two tokens indicate that the rupture disk opened fully, with a
partial rupture being indicated by one token. The voting transition13TPAF1 adds two tokens to PPARF1 for each failed valve. A partial
disk rupture adds one. This tracks the equivalent high pressure
injection capacity loss. For example, if all of the rupture disks par-
tially opened or if two of the AOVs failed to open, there would
remain sufficient capacity in both cases. Active pressure accumula-
tor capacity is tallied at PPASA, fulfilling the requirements for
TPASA1 to fire once the equivalent of two accumulators come
online. TPASA1 fires after a half-hour delay to mark the end of high
pressure injection. However, the pipes connecting each pressure
accumulator to must remain intact in sufficient numbers for this
duration, otherwise, its high pressure coolant contribution is lost
midway upon pipe rupture, see TPAPR1a and TPAPR1b.
Once the pressure accumulators are exhausted, low pressure
injection begins, wherein coolant flows under gravity from the
over head pool into the core. First, the non-return valve must open,
success and failure of this being TPINRO1 and TPINRF1. If open, the
Table 5
Timed transition parameters for reactor control and reactivity monitoring Petri Net seen in Fig. 11.
Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref. Transition Type Parameter(s) Ref.
TAH1H uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TFRDIC(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:33 105, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion)
TAH1L uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TFRDND(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:33 105, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion)
TASHF1 Weibull g ¼ 34500, b ¼ 1:1 (Smith, 1981; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TFRIIC(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:33 105, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion)
TASSI1 Weibull g ¼ 100000, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion) TFRICD(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:33 105, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion)
TCDIC(1–3) delay a ¼ 0:0001 (Expert Opinion) TFRICR(1–3) uniform a ¼ 4:0 (Expert Opinion)
TCDND(1–3) delay a ¼ 0:0001 (Expert Opinion) TFRNDR(1–3) uniform a ¼ 4:0 (Expert Opinion)
TCRD1 delay a ¼ 2:0 N/A TICVE delay a ¼ 0:0 N/A
TCRDF1 Weibull g ¼ 20000, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion) TNDVE delay a ¼ 0:0 N/A
TCRE1H uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TRAS1H uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A
TCRE1L uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TRAS1L uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A
TCRI1 delay a ¼ 2:0 N/A TRE1 Weibull g ¼ 87700, b ¼ 1:0 (Expert Opinion)
TCRS1H uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TRTC1 delay a ¼ 6:0 N/A
TCRS1L uniform a ¼ 4:0 N/A TRTH1 delay a ¼ 6:0 N/A
TCRSF1 Weibull g ¼ 20700, b ¼ 1:1 (Expert Opinion; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TSPEF(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 17100, b ¼ 1:1 (Expert Opinion; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TFDDIC(1–3) uniform u ¼ 0:1 (Expert Opinion) TSPER(1–3) delay a ¼ 1:0 N/A
TFDDND(1–3) uniform u ¼ 0:1 (Expert Opinion) TSRIC(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:43 105, b ¼ 1:0 (IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TFDIIC(1–3) uniform u ¼ 0:1 (Expert Opinion) TSRICR(1–3) cyclic c ¼ 4383:0 N/A
TFDICD(1–3) uniform u ¼ 0:1 (Expert Opinion) TSRND(1–3) Weibull g ¼ 1:43 105, b ¼ 1:0 (IAEA, 1988; Barringer &
Associates, Inc., 2010)
TFDICR(1–3) uniform a ¼ 4:0 (Expert Opinion) TSRNDR(1–3) cyclic c ¼ 4383:0 N/A
TFDNDR(1–3) uniform a ¼ 4:0 (Expert Opinion) – – – –
Table 6
Results from the Petri Nets seen in Figs. 7–11, showing both overall operating durations and those of each of the possible outcomes. Additional results for SDS-2 are found in









Primary Coolant 105 (1.9000.003)104 Coolant Faults 0.3140.018 (1.310.04)104 3.88103 2.41104
Circulation Safe Shutdown 99.6860.018 (1.9020.003)104 7.241103 2.726104
Shutdown Condensers 5.24105 (1.51930.0013)
104
SDC/DHR Over 99.99980.0002 (1.52190.0013)104 2.9641103 2.7258104
SDC Failure 0 N/A N/A N/A
Emergency Shutdown 0.00020.0002 9.36103 (One data point) N/A N/A
Emergency Core
Coolant
105 (1.0960.002)104 Maintenance Shutdown 32.630.15 (1.0490.003)104 4.950103 1.801104
Injection PA System Failure 0 N/A N/A N/A
GDWP Failure 0.0420.007 (1.300.14)104 1.52103 2.61104
Core Submerged 67.330.15 (1.1180.003)104 1.925103 2.261104
Emergency Shutdown 105 (1.3400.0020)
104
SDS-1 Complete 96.770.06 (1.3520.003)104 2.6562103 2.4459104
(See Table 7 for SDS-2) SDS-2 Complete 0 N/A N/A N/A
SDS Failure 0 N/A N/A N/A
Forced Shutdown 0.00100.0010 1.35104 (One data point) N/A N/A
Unplanned Shutdown 3.230.06 (9.640.11)103 1.764103 1.899104
Control & Monitoring 5105 (1.28550.0018)
104
Reactor Supercritical 0.00120.0005 (6.71.7)103 2.6103 1.2104
(See Table 8 for more
details)
Reactor Subcritical 0.00060.0003 (1.10.7)104 1.3103 2.4104
IC Reactivity Increase
Detection
24.970.06 (1.2850.004)104 1.496103 2.925104
IC Reactivity Decrease
Detection
24.950.06 (1.2860.004)104 1.480103 2.904104
IC Contradiction 0.00240.0007 (1.50.4)104 4.0103 2.5104
ND Reactivity Increase
Detection
25.040.06 (1.2810.004)104 1.485103 2.903104
ND Reactivity Decrease
Detection
25.030.006 (1.2880.004)104 1.496103 2.918104
ND Contradiction 0.00140.0005 (1.70.7)104 1.7103 4.4104
Note: IC = Ion Chambers, ND = Neutron Detectors.
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may open fully, partially open, or fail completely, as captured by
TPIRDO1, TPIRDOP1, and TPIRDF1 respectively. Full coolant flow
allows the low pressure injection to be complete in three days,14with partially flow, this is extended to six days. As low pressure
injection relies on a reservoir of water, leakage from which will
prevent its proper function. Leaks are represented by TSCPL1. If a
leak occurs before demand, the reactor must be shutdown for cor-
Fig. 12. Results from the primary coolant circulation system. (a) Safe Shutdown –
Predicted distribution of operational duration of systems reaching a safe shutdown
state in the primary coolant system. (b) Initiating Event – Predicted distribution of
operational duration of systems reaching a critical failed state. (c) Primary Coolant
System Duration of Operation – Probability of the primary coolant system operating
uninterrupted over time (i.e. not encountering a critical failure or the need to shut
down for repair). Note that reactor shutdown is scheduled to begin after three years
of operation. (d) Coolant Circuit Failures – Predicted average number of failed steam
separator coolant circuits over operating time. (e) Number of Offline Feed Pumps –
Predicted average number of off-line feed pumps over operating time. Note that one
pump should always be offline as a standby. (f) Critical Feed Pump Failure –
Predicted average probability of encountering critical feed pump failure over
operating time. (g) Turbine Isolation Demand – Probability of demand for turbine
isolation over operating time. (h) Steam Circuit Failures – Probability of varying
numbers of failed steam circuits during operation of the reactor. (i) Number of
Failed Steam Circuits Causing Early Shutdown – Number of Failed Steam Circuits
Causing Early Shutdown – Probability of early shutdown being caused by one or
two steam circuit failures during operation of the reactor.
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coolant injection process, TSCPFP1 fires instead, marking failure
of emergency core coolant injection.
All valves become more likely to fail on demand with each year
that passes, and this is modelled by the place conditional arc from
PV2 to those transitions representing valve failures.4.4. Emergency shutdown systems
In the Petri Net for the emergency shutdown systems found in
Fig. 10, the yellow and green sections respectively model the emer-15gency shutdown rod insertion (SDS-1) and the boric acid neutron
poison moderation injection process (SDS-2). Possible outcomes
for this Petri Net are the shutdown of the reactor by either SDS-1
or SDS-2, the failure of both shutdown systems, the forced shut-
down of the reactor for urgent maintenance, or an unplanned shut-
down due to premature actions of components in the shutdown
process.
Fig. 13. Results from the shutdown condenser system. (a) Shutdown Condensation
Complete – Predicted distribution of time of successful completion of the reactor
shutdown condensation process. (b) Shutdown Condenser Failures – Predicted
distribution of the number of shutdown condenser units failing during the
shutdown condensation process.
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Fig. 14. Results from the emergency core coolant injection system. (a) Emergency
Core Coolant Injection – Predicted distribution of operating time at which faults in
the emergency core coolant injection system required the reactor to shutdown for
maintenance. (b) Failure of Gravity Driven Low Pressure Coolant Injection –
Predicted distribution of operational time at which the gravity driven injection of
low pressure coolant failed. (c) Core Sumberged – Predicted distribution of
operational time at which core submersion was completed by the emergency core
coolant injection system. (d) Failed Pressure Accumulators – Predicted distribution
of the number of pressure accumulators failing during demand for high pressure
injection, representing the emergency core coolant injection system.
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is generated at an arbitrary point in the operation period with uni-
form probability density by transition TSDS1, which puts a token
on each of PRIB(1–40). To properly insert, an individual rod’s pro-
tection system signal and de-latch mechanism must both operate
correctly, and the rod must avoid jamming on its descent into its
slot in the core, with the transitions representing those successes
and failures respectively being TRPSS(1–40), TRDLS(1–40), and
TRIS(1–40), and TRPSF(1–40), TRDLF(1–40), and TRIF(1–40). The
actuator can also be disabled by failure before demand, see
TRACTF1, with TRACTR1 representing its restoration. Every rod
failure puts a token on PNRF1 and every correct insertion adds to
PNRI1. SDS-1 is considered to have succeeded if 38 of the 40 rods
insert fully. Therefore, if the token count at PNRI1 reaches that
threshold, TSDS1 fires, indicating the success of SDS-1 and ending17the simulation. Conversely if three or more tokens reach PNRF1,
TSDS1F fires, marking the failure of SDS-1 and initiates demand
for SDS-2.
The second shutdown system, SDS-2, injects the potent neutron
poison, boric acid, directly into the core’s heavy water moderator.
The poison is driven by the releases of pressurised helium, the
release mechanism for which may fail on demand. This is repre-
sented by THERMF1, and results in the failure of SDS-2. Otherwise,
correct action is represented by THERMS1. The boric acid must
then pass through of the parallel valves (pressure driven, reactor
trip signal activated, and manually opened), and as such the correct
opening of any one of which is sufficient alone for SDS-2 to be suc-
cessful. If all three valves failure to open, SDS-2 fails. The transi-
tions repenting the opening and failure of these valves are
respectively, TBPVO1, TBRTVS1, and TBMRVO1, and TBPVF1,
TBRTVF1, and TBMRVF1, the later having a place conditional rela-
tionship with PV2, increasing the risk of failure on demand with
each year. The premature release of the helium pressure or open-
ing of one of the boric acid release valve causes and unplanned
shutdown resulting from undesired poison in the moderator,
respectively represented as THERMSO1, TBPVSO1, TBRTVSO1,
TBMRVSO1. If leaks develop in either the helium supply or the tank
of boric acid, respectively THESF1 and TBTL1, the operators are
forced to shutdown the reactor to enact immediate repairs.
Fig. 15. Results from the emergency reactor shutdown systems. (a) SDS-1 Complete
– Predicted distribution of operation time at which SDS-1 successfully completed
following a call for reactor emergency shutdown. (b) Unplanned Shutdown –
Predicted distribution of operational time at which an unplanned shutdown
occurred as a result of premature action on the part of a component in the
emergency shutdown system. (c) Failed Shutdown Rods – Predicted distribution of
the number of shutdown rod failures during use of the emergency shutdown
systems.
Fig. 16. Results from the reactor control and monitoring systems. (a) Reactor
Control & Monitoring During of Operation – Probability of uninterrupted operation
before the emergence of a critical fault in the reactor control and monitoring
systems. This graph is truncated at the end of scheduled reactor shutdown at
3 years 40 days. (b) Overall Sensor Readiness – Probability of individual sensor
readiness for all ion chambers and neutron detectors in the reactor control and
monitoring system, where ‘‘sensor readiness” refers to a sensor being in a state of
readiness to correctly report a change in reactor reactivity. The graph is truncated at
the end of scheduled reactor shutdown after 3 years 40 days.
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This Petri Net, seen in Fig. 11, is concerned with control systems
of the reactor and the sensors used to monitor its state. Outcomes
for this Petri Net include the undetected emergence of a supercrit-
ical or subcritical state, and the detection by either the ion cham-
bers or neutron detectors of such a problem, with the additional
probability of contradictory results being produced by either sen-
sor block.
The control rods can experience a fault in their drive system or
signal controlling them, either of which will result in the rod being
in an undesired position. Similarly, the rods will be incorrectly
placed if a hardware or software failure emerges in the automation
system. Therefore, each of these faults will result in the control
rods being too high or too low. Note these outcomes are abbrevi-
ated, such that P(IC/ND) VI is the result of the ion chamber/neutron
detector sensor block voting on a reactivity increase, P(IC/ND) VD18
Table 7





Summary of probability of the possible readings given by all individual ion chambers
and neutron detectors in the reactor control and monitoring system, as represented
by the Petri Net in Fig. 11. Of false positives, (24.990.04)% were predicted to coincide
with another in the same sensor block, such as to produce an overall false positive
from the voting system.




Fig. 17. Effect on the likelihood of a coolant fault from varying two parameters –
feed pump service period, and mean time to failure of the steam separator pressure
release valves.
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ing on a reactivity decrease, and P(IC/ND) VE is the result of the ion
chamber/neutron detector sensor block voting producing a contra-
dictory results – for example one sensor reading a reactivity
increase and another reading a decrease.
A reactivity event can arise as a result of issues with the
automation system, the control rods themselves, or from problems
internal to the reactor, and the sections of the Petri Net dealing
with each of these are respectively highlighted red, yellow, and
blue on Fig. 11a. The automation system may suffer either hard-
ware or software failure, and the control rods can develop a fault
in their electric drive or ability to receive and respond to control
signals. These are respectively represented by TASHF1, TASSI1,
TCRDF1, and TCRSF1. When a such an issue arises, the result will
be either the rods in a position higher than intended, or lower than
intended, with transitions TCRF(1–4) and TASF(1–4) making the
selection. There is a window of opportunity to effect restorative
actions, represented by TAH1H, TAH1L, TRAS1H, TRAS1L, TCRE1H,
TCRE1L, TCRS1H, and TCRS1L, but failure to act in time results in a
reactivity event, recorded by the firing of TCRI1 and TCRD1. TRE1,
represents the occurrence of a reactivity event resulting from an
internal problem within the core, with TREI1 and TRED1 determin-
ing whether it is an increase or decrease in reactivity.19Once a reactivity event is ongoing, the goal of the sensor blocks
is to detect it before it develops into a more serious problem. This
is dealt with in the green section of the Petri Net. There are two
sensor blocks, consisting of three ion chambers (IC) and three neu-
tron detectors (ND). The structure shown represents one individual
sensor and is therefore repeated as two sets of three. When a token
is in its default, waiting for stimulation, a token is seen at PNR(IC/
ND)(1–3). If a token appears at PRE to indicate a real event and the
sensor functions as intended, TCD(IC/ND)(1–3) fires to record it,
with TCDI(IC/ND)(1–3) and TCDD(IC/ND)(1–3) respectively cate-
gorising it as an increase or decrease in reactivity according to
whether a token is at PREI1 or PRED1. Otherwise, the sensor may
fail to detect the event, either because it has become temporarily
unresponsive, with TSR(IC/ND)(1–3) and TSR(IC/ND)(1–3) repre-
senting its loss of responsiveness and return respectively, or
because it fails on demand, represented by TFDI(IC/ND)(1–3) and
TFDD(IC/ND)(1–3) for reactivity increases and decreases respec-
tively. TFD(IC/ND) R(1–3) allows additionally opportunities for
the sensor to respond after a delay. Temporary false positive read-
ings are also a possibility, where false positive increases in reactiv-
ity are represented by TFRI(IC/ND)(1–3) and false positive
decreases by TFRD(IC/ND)(1–3), and TFR(IC/ND) R(1–3) returns
the sensor to its default state.
The section of the Petri Net found in Fig. 11b deals with the vot-
ing system. If any two sensors concurrently give the same reading,
the operators of the reactor are supplied with that information
such that action may be taken. T(IC/ND) VI fires for a reactivity
increase measurement and T(IC/ND) VD for a decrease. If two sen-
sors of a block are both producing a reading, but those readings are
contradictory, T(IC/ND) VE fires to alert the operator that some
problem has arisen, even if its exact nature is not known. These
messages are dependant on the signal processing electronics, of
which there are three sets. Providing that at least two are in normal
working order, messages from the sensor block will be transmitted.
The failure of one of the units in the signal processing electronics is
represented by TSPEF(1–3), and the number of failures is recorded
at PSPE4. TSPER(1–3) represent the repair of the units, putting
tokens back to PSPE(1–3). If the number of tokens on PSPE4
reaches two, inhibit arcs to T(IC/ND) VI, T(IC/ND) VD, and T(IC/
ND) VE are satisfied, preventing any signals being sent from the
ion chamber or neutron detector blocks.5. Results
Each sub-system was simulated from the start of its operation
until it arrived at some terminal state which represented the safe
shutdown of the system or the occurrence of a failed condition.
After a significant number of simulations (iterations), enabling
convergence in the predictions, the probability of arriving at each
of the possible terminal states was determined and is reported in
Table 6, with convergence considered to have been achieved when
the error bounds of features of interest have reduced to be small
relative to their absolute value. Along with the total iterations,
the table also indicates the average time duration taken to arrive
at each end state and the corresponding 10th and 90th percentiles.
Where relevant, the confidence bounds given in the figures and
tables of this work are quantified by the standard error of the
mean, i.e. 1r confidence bounds of approximately 68%. The quan-
tification of the uncertainty attached to the results is helpful for
two purposes: – Firstly, when the results of one simulation are
used to determine parameters in another, the inclusion of the con-
fidence bounds accounts for the uncertainty of the value intro-
duced from another model, such as seen in Section 4.2 –
Secondly, in a practical setting, error analysis is useful when
assessing a specific system to highlight whether sufficient compu-
Table 9
Results from sensitivity analysis performed on the primary coolant circulation Petri Net seen in Section 4.1.
Variant Average Duration [hours] Outcome Probability [%] Outcome Average Duration [hours] Percentiles [hours]
10th 90th
FPSP + 50% (1.9120.003)104 Coolant Faults 0.3330.018 (1.350.04)104 4.47103 2.40104
Safe Shutdown 99.6670.018 (1.9140.003)104 7.364103 2.726104
FPSP 50% (1.8810.003)104 Coolant Faults 0.3670.019 (1.400.04)104 4.41103 2.46104
Safe Shutdown 99.6330.019 (1.8820.003)104 7.104103 2.726104
SSPRV + 50% (2.0900.002)104 Coolant Faults 0.2110.015 (1.480.05)104 4.66103 2.43104
Safe Shutdown 99.7890.015 (2.0910.002)104 8.229103 2.73104
SSPRV + 10% (1.9480.003)104 Coolant Faults 0.2840.017 (1.330.04)104 4.77103 2.44104
Safe Shutdown 99.7160.017 (1.9500.003)104 7.498103 2.726104
SSPRV 10% (1.8410.003)104 Coolant Faults 0.3600.019 (1.340.04)104 4.12103 2.47104
Safe Shutdown 99.6400.019 (1.8430.003)104 7.043103 2.726104
SSPRV 50% (1.4780.002)104 Coolant Faults 0.940.03 (1.130.02)104 3.92103 2.14104
Safe Shutdown 99.060.03 (1.4810.002)104 6.05103 2.726104
Note: FPSP = Feed Pump Service Period, SSPRV = Steam Separator Pressure Release Valve.
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reliable whenmaking safety critical decisions relating to the design
in question.
The results of the subsystem simulations are presented in
Figs. 12–16, following the same order as that in which the models
were presented in Section 4. Histograms in the figures depict the
variation in the predicted durations to achieve each terminal state
are found in Figs. 12a, 12b, 13a, 14a, 14b, 14c, 15a, and 15b.
Figs. 12c and 16a show the respective predicted probabilities that
the primary coolant system and the reactor control and monitoring
system will be continuing to operate uninterrupted after a given
period from the beginning of their operation, without shutting
down or encountering a critical error. Predictions for five indicators
of the operational health of the reactor across time are found in
Figs. 12d, 12e, 12f, 12g, and 16b. These are respectively the average
number of coolant circuits to have failed, the average number of
feed pumps in an off-line state, the probability of encountering
the critical threshold of feed pump failures, the probability of
demand for turbine isolation, and the probability that each individ-
ual sensor in the ion chamber and neutron sensor blocks is in a
ready state to produce an accurate reading of changes in reactivity
status. The histograms found in Figs. 12h, 13b, 14d, and 15c respec-
tively depict the predicted probability of a given number of failed
steam circuits, shutdown condensers, pressure accumulators, and
shutdown rods failing on demand. The histogram in Fig. 12i shows
the probability that early shutdown will be caused by either one or
two steam circuit failures within the operation of the reactor
system.6. Discussion
The simulations predict a high expectation that the primary
coolant system will shut down safely when maintenance is
required, with a low likelihood of requiring emergency interven-
tion. The predicted average operational period until shutdown or
failure was just under 2.2 years, with a 61.3% probability of requir-
ing early maintenance before the end of the default three-year
operating period. In Figs. 12a and 12c, the prominent spike in the
probability of shutdown just after 0.6 years is the result of the
delay between the emergence of a single steam separator circuit
fault and the command to shut down to perform repair actions.
As seen in Fig. 12h, there is a 66.9% chance that one or more
steam circuits will fail, 9.78% chance that two or more will fail,
and a 0.191% chance that the critical threshold of three failed cir-
cuits will be reached. From Fig. 12i it is seen that there is a likeli-20hood of 52.3% of a single steam circuit failure occurring without a
second failure subsequently forcing immediate shutdown before
the end of the six-month delay, and that there is an 8.29% percent
chance of two steam circuit failures within six months of each
other. Thus, once one steam circuit has failed, there is an 86.4%
probability that a second will fail in that period.
Small spikes in the need for early shutdown probability are seen
periodically in Fig. 12a, corresponding to the servicing of the cool-
ant feed-pumps, wherein the failure to start the back-up pump
may arise, which is reflected in both the likelihood of critical of
feed pump failure and demand for turbine isolation, see Figs. 12f
and 12g. Overall, critical feed pump failure is predicted to occur
with 3.67% probability.
By inspecting the results from the model it was found that given
a demand for turbine isolation, there is a 0.889% probability of sub-
sequently encountered an initiating event during the shutdown
condenser period, and a 0.944% chance of requiring the use of
the back-up isolation valve due to undesired opening of the main
valve. A fault more serious than that which could be handled by
the primary coolant circulation system alone is predicted to occur
in 0.314% of cases, at average time of 1.31104 hours from the
beginning of operation. Given that the reactor is predicted to be
shut down on average once for every 1.90104 hours, if repairs
and maintenance take an average of two weeks, the resulting
unavailability of primary coolant circulation would be 1.24%.
Reducing repairs and maintenance to 24 h would bring the figure
down to 0.0889%.
The simulations yielded a high probability of availability for the
shutdown condensation system with a likelihood of approximately
0.0002% for the need to shut down to perform repairs within the
given period. With regards failures during demand on the system,
one or more failed shutdown condensers are predicted to be
encountered with a probability of 0.437%, with the likelihoods of
0.434% and 0.00286% predicted for one and two failed condensers
respectively, see Fig. 13b.
The emergency core cooling injection process had a high likeli-
hood of requiring maintenance at a probability almost one in three,
but given demand for the system, there was a 99.94% likelihood of
successful core submersion. The low pressure injection phase rep-
resents the highest period of risk, see Fig. 14b, while even manage-
able disruptions to high pressure injection following demand are
predicted to occur with a probability of only 0.0891%, as seen in
Fig. 14d.
As visible in Fig. 15c, within the emergency shutdown systems,
SDS-1 was seen to be effective at providing sufficient emergency
shutdown capacity, with the failure of one and two shutdown rods
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Disruptions from unplanned shutdown or forced shutdown,
respectively being the premature action on the part of some com-
ponent actioning undesired shutdown, and the emergence of a
fault in the system that mandates immediate shutdown, are pre-
dicted to occur with respective probabilities of 3.23% and 0.001%
within the operating period. A separate set of 105 simulations
was conducted subsequently, to collect more data from SDS-2
under the condition of SDS-1 having failed, with these results pre-
sented in Table 7, and showing the probability of SDS-2 completing
safely to be slightly less than 1000 times greater than its failure.
In the case of the control and monitoring systems, problems
resulting from the reactor entering a supercritical or subcritical
state are predicted to emerge in 0.0018% of cases, will all other sys-
tems expected to end with a detection of some variant, including
spurious detections and contradictory detections. As seen in
Table 8, although almost a fifth of the readings delivered by all sen-
sors were predicted to be false, the 2 of 3 voting systemmeans that
of these, it is predicted that approximately three quarters would
not coincide with another false reading, such as to cause the three
sensors of the block to vote for a spurious result. In Fig. 16b, the
predicted preparedness of sensors to make a reading is seen to
periodically fluctuate with respect to time, mostly due to the fail-
ure of individual sensors between maintenance actions. On the
basis of these probabilities, if an average repair time of two weeks
could be achieved, the unavailability of the control and monitoring
system would be 0.256%, and for a 24-h repair time, this would be
0.247%.7. Sensitivity analysis
Computational safety analysis of a system has the advantage of
enabling convenient exploration of what-if? scenarios. It is possible
to reveal the sensitivity to alterations in parameters – for example,
to consider the effects of replacing a component with an alterna-
tive with a different failure profile, or of changing the regime of
maintenance actions. Using the primary coolant circulation model
seen in Section 4.1 to demonstrate this, two such examples have
been selected, namely the feed pump servicing period and the
mean time to failure of the steam separator pressure release valve
(chosen due to being the most common failure mode in simula-
tions resulting in a coolant fault). Variants of model where the for-
mer is altered by 50% and the latter by 10% and 50% have been
created, with simulation batch sizes of 105, the results of which are
found in Table 9. These simulations were identical to the equiva-
lent batch presented in Section 5 in all other respects.
As seen in Fig. 17, the variance in pump servicing period was
slight in its impact, and more simulations would be required to
confidently assert statistic significance. On the other hand, altering
the mean time to failure of the steam separator pressure release
valve was more substantial in its effect, particularly when reduced
by 50%. These results would seem to imply that sourcing more reli-
able valves would be a more effective strategy to improve the over-
all system performance than alteration of the maintenance
schedule.8. Conclusions
To explore the application of the Petri Nets methodology to
nuclear power generation, five models were constructed to depict
various subsystems within a hypothetical power plant with typical
modern design features, such as an emphasis on passive safety.
With the parametrisation of the Petri Nets given, simulations pre-
dicted a high proportion of final states considered safe or otherwise
preferable to more dangerous alternatives (for example, early shut-21down of the reactor instead of a critical fault). With the two sys-
tems relating to everyday processes of the reactor, namely
primary coolant fault circulation and the control and monitoring
systems (respectively seen in Figs. 7 and 11), their anticipated fail-
ure rates can be quantified in terms of the occurrence of dangerous
end states in proportion to the total time simulated across all their
iterations. Thus, a coolant fault initiating event at a rate of
(1.650.09)107 per operational hour, and the emergence of an
undetected reactivity event at a rate of (2.31.3)109 per opera-
tional hour are predicted. Another notable general feature of the
systems is a high probability of early failure, before the time limit
for routine shutdown. If the period of scheduled whole-system
maintenance was reduced from three years, the predicted occur-
rence of early shutdown could be reduced somewhat.
Potential avenues for future research include using these models
as a starting point for building a single Petri Net for the whole system,
and looking at expansions and augmentations to the methodology.
For example, coupling a Petri Net with a physical model of the heat
transfer processes resulting from a crisis. As it was also demonstrated
in this work how analysis of the sensitivity of a system to variance in
the value of its parameters can be performed, this could be extended
to attempting to improve the predicted system reliability through the
application of an optimisation routine to free parameters such as
inspection and maintenance schedules or the selection and level of
redundancy of key components.
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